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ABSTRACT
Manyobserversandscholarsarguethatprimaryelectionscontributetoideological
polarization in U.S. politics. We test this claim using congressional elections and
roll call voting behavior. Many of our ﬁndings are null. We ﬁnd little evidence
that the introduction of primary elections, the level of primary election turnout,
or the threat of primary competition are associated with partisan polarization in
congressional roll call voting. We also ﬁnd little evidence that extreme roll call
votingrecordsarepositivelyassociatedwithprimaryelectionoutcomes.Apositive
ﬁnding is that general election competition exerts pressure toward convergence as
extreme roll call voting is negatively correlated with general election outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
Direct primary elections are widely believed to having a polarizing effect on the U.S.
Congress.1 The need to win primary elections in order to secure a seat in Congress
potentiallycreatesamotivationforcongressionalcandidatestotakeextremepolicyposi-
tionstosatisfytheirpartyelectorates.Jacobson(2004,p.16)writes,“Primaryelectorates
are much more partisan and prone to ideological extremity, and the need to please them
is one force behind party polarization in Congress.”2 The polarizing effect of primary
elections has gained renewed interest in recent years as a potential explanation for the
rise in partisan polarization in the U.S. Congress over the last three decades.
This view that primaries have a polarizing effect on the policy positions of members
of Congress (MCs) is also frequently expressed in the media. Here is one example from
the Chicago Tribune: “Voters in primaries are generally political activists who represent
the ideological extremes of the two major parties. Thus, Democrats tend to choose
candidates who are more liberal than the general electorate and Republicans tend to
choosecandidateswhoaremoreconservativethanthegeneralelectorate”(Markus,1992,
p.20).MCs,knowingtheywillneedtosatisfytheirprimaryelectorates,haveanincentive
to continue to take extreme roll call voting positions once in Congress.
Politicaleconomymodelswithcandidatescompetinginprimaryandgeneralelections
formalize the logic for how primary competition leads to polarization (e.g., Aranson and
Ordeshook,1972;Coleman,1972;OwenandGrofman,2006).Thesemodelspredictthat
when an ideological divide exists between the primary electorates of the two parties and
primaryelectionsarefullycontested,strategiccandidateswilltakepolicypositionsaway
from the general election median voter and toward the median voter of their primary
electorate.
Althoughtheconventionalwisdomsuggeststhattheintroductionofprimaryelections
will have a polarizing effect on the positions of members of Congress, there are surpris-
ingly few empirical studies that test this idea directly. Thus, the ﬁrst question we ask
in this paper is: Do members of Congress take more extreme policy positions after the
introduction of mandatory direct primary laws in their state? To identify whether such
a relationship exists, we exploit variation in the timing of states’ adoption of mandatory
direct primary laws. We ﬁnd no evidence that the introduction of primaries is associated
with MCs taking more extreme roll call voting positions.
1 See Brady et al. (2007), Burden (2001, 2004), Fiorina et al. (2006), Fiorina and Levendusky (2006),
HackerandPierson(2006),Jacobson(2004),King(2003),Sinclair(2006),andWrightandBerkman
(1986).
2 Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006, p. 530) write, “Primaries attract hardcore partisans, who tend
to come from the ideological extremes of the two big parties, and these voters in turn choose
candidatesoflimitedappealtothemiddle-of-the-roadvoterswhodominatethegeneralelectorate.”
Sinclair (2006, pp. 29–30) writes that activists “always vote, they vote in primaries, and they give
money or work for candidates. To win in the primary, the candidate needs to be especially attentive
and responsive to activists who are more polarized than less interested voters. The candidates who
emerge from primaries are likely to be acceptable to the activist.”Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress 171
Inthesecondpartofthispaperweexaminewhethercertainconditionsstrengthenthe
polarizingeffectprimarieshaveonrollcallvotingbehavior.Theliteraturehighlightstwo
variables that are believed to affect the relationship between primaries and polarization:
(i)thedegreetowhichtheprimaryelectoratesarepolarized;and(ii)thedegreetowhich
MCs face electoral threats from primary challengers.
A common argument in the literature is that the rising polarization in Congress is
due to the increasing ideological extremism of the primary electorate. This change in
the primary electorate is often attributed to greater ideological sorting among partisans
(Fiorina et al., 2006; Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006) and/or to declining turnout among
primaryvoters(King,2003).However,thereislittledirectempiricalevidencetoconnect
theincreasingideologicalextremismofprimaryelectoratestopolarizationinCongress.3
Weexploitthevariationinturnoutbetweenstatesandovertimetoaskasimplequestion:
Is the level of primary election turnout associated with roll call voting positions of
members of Congress? We ﬁnd little evidence that low primary turnout is associated
with the selection of senators with extreme roll call voting positions or with changes in
incumbent senators’ roll call voting positions over time.
Another common argument is that the rising polarization in Congress is due to the
increasing threat MCs face from potential primary election challengers. In particular,
partisangerrymanderingisarguedtohaveledHousememberstobemoreconcernedwith
primaryratherthangeneralelectionchallengers.McCartyetal.(2006,p.666)summarize
the argument as follows: “Presumably in an era of declining competition politicians no
longer feel the need to reach out to moderate and independent voters to win elections.
Instead politicians are free to pander to their ideological and partisan base. Politicians
who do not pander may face primary challenges by ideologically purer candidates.”4
Several empirical studies examine the relationship between primary competition MCs
3 AnotableexceptionisthestudybyGerberandMorton(1998).Theyexploittheconnectionbetween
primary laws and the ideological and partisan composition of voters eligible to vote in primaries to
show that members of Congress nominated in “closed” primaries tend to have policy positions that
are farther from the preferences of their general electorate than those nominated in more “open”
primaries.However,theeffecttheyﬁndisrathermodestanddoesnotruleoutthepossibilitythatthe
results may be reﬂecting other state characteristics correlated with primary election laws. Bullock
andClinton(2010)alsoﬁndonlymodesteffectswhentheyinvestigatethemovetoblanketprimaries
in California.
4 Hetherington (2009, p. 423) describes the redistricting and polarization argument as follows: “The
absenceofinter-partycompetitioninmostelectionsispotentiallyimportantbecauseavastmajority
of members need not worry much about losing elections if they are more ideologically extreme than
their district. Such a member would, on average, face more peril in a primary election. Importantly,
primary election constituencies, especially those in closed primary states, ought to be more ideolog-
icallyextremethangeneralelectionconstituencies.”Mann(2005,p.4)writes,“Manyobserversand
participants believe redistricting fuels this polarization, by creating safe seats in which incumbents
have strong incentives to reﬂect the views of their party’s most extreme supporters — i.e., those
active in primary elections — and little reason to reach out to swing voters.” Galston and Nivola
(2006, p. 25) write, “The direct primary (or threat thereof), not the general election, becomes the
deﬁning political event.”172 Hirano et al.
face and polarization in their roll call voting behavior. These studies provide mixed
results.5
Our analysis differs from existing studies on primary competition and polarization by
using a measure of the potential threat of primary competition rather than the actual
competition MCs face in their previous election. Since strategic candidates are likely
to adjust their position to minimize electoral threats, whether MCs face primary com-
petition is unlikely to be an accurate measure of the actual underlying primary threat
they face.6 Hacker and Pierson (2006, p. 126) write that “even when a primary challenge
does not materialize, the fact that one might occur can effectively pull candidates toward
their base.” We present a simple model to demonstrate how using MCs’ own observed
primary competition to measure the threat of primary competition can produce biased
estimates of the relationship between primary competition and roll call voting behavior.
The model isolates two sources of bias — endogeneity and measurement error. We then
discusshowusingavariablebasedonprimaryelectionreturnsfordown-ballotstatewide
ofﬁces to measure the threat of primary competition will, in some cases, be less suscep-
tible to the same endogeneity and measurement error concerns. Using this alternative
measure we ask: Is the variation in the threat of potential primary competition across
states related to senators’ roll call voting behaviors? We ﬁnd little evidence that such a
relationship exists.
Overall,thevariousempiricalinvestigationssuggestthatprimaryelectionsdonothave
a large impact on MCs’ roll call voting positions, even when the ideological composition
of the primary electorate appears to be relatively extreme or when the threat of primary
competition appears to be particularly strong.
In the ﬁnal section of this paper, we brieﬂy investigate why the conventional wisdom
maynotreﬂecttheactualrelationshipbetweenprimariesandpolarizationinCongress.In
particular we examine whether primary elections provide the strong electoral incentive
forcandidatestotakeextremepositionsassuggestedbytheconventionalwisdom.Brady
et al. (2007) ﬁnd evidence that House members with more extreme roll call voting
positions have relatively higher primary election vote shares. Our analysis exploits the
multi-member district feature of Senate elections to examine whether differences in
roll call voting positions of senators from the same party and same state are related to
differences in the senators’ primary vote shares. We ﬁnd no evidence that a signiﬁcant
association exists between senators’ roll call voting positions and their primary election
returns. However, we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative correlation between extreme roll call
votingpositionsandgeneralelectionreturns.Thissuggeststhatthelogicunderlyingthe
conventional wisdom may not accurately reﬂect the degree to which primaries provide
an electoral motivation for candidates to take extreme policy positions.
5 See Ansolabehere et al. (2001), Burden (2004), and Pearson and Lawless (2007).
6 Fiorina and Levendusky (2006, p. 70) write, “Even though few incumbents face serious primary
challenges, it would be a mistake to conclude that primary elections are unimportant. In all likeli-
hood, incumbents act strategically to preclude primary challenges. Even if they are unlikely to face
a challenge, candidates take special pains to maintain the support of their party’s hard-core voters.”Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress 173
POLARIZATION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF PRIMARIES
In this section we ask a simple question: Do members of Congress take more extreme
policypositionsfollowingtheintroductionofmandatorydirectprimaryelectionsintheir
state?Weexploitvariationintheadoptionofstatelawsmakingprimaryelectionsmanda-
tory to test whether MCs changed their roll call voting positions once they began being
nominatedthroughprimaryelections.Inparticularweexaminesevenstateswhichintro-
duced direct primary laws for congressional elections after the New Deal realignment:
Connecticut (1956), Delaware (1970), Indiana (1976), New Mexico (1940), New York
(1968), Rhode Island (1948), and Utah (1938).7 We focus on this later period since the
issues separating the Democratic and Republican parties probably differed signiﬁcantly
before and after the New Deal.8
Although not a random sample, these states provide us at least some insight into
whether the introduction of mandatory primaries have a general polarizing effect on the
roll call voting behavior of MCs. According to the logic discussed above, MCs should
adjust their policy positions to account for the electoral insecurity they potentially face
if the primary voters choose to back a candidate with more extreme policy positions.
Beforeproceeding,wemuststatehowpolarizationisdeﬁnedinthispaper.Wefocuson
thecontributionofindividualMCstopolarization.ForRepublicanswedeﬁneindividual
i’s contribution to polarization in Congress t, Iit,a s( Nit − ¯ NRt) where Nit is MC i’s
DW-NOMINATE score in Congress t and ¯ NRt is the average nominate score for all
RepublicansinCongresst.ForDemocrats,Iit is−(Nit− ¯ NDt),where ¯ NDt istheaverage
nominate score for all Democrats in Congress t. Note that we orient the roll call scores
so that higher values of Iit are associated with larger contributions to polarization. In
addition, we measure individuals relative to their parties. We do this in order to account
for factors that affect all members within a party. This helps us isolate the effect of
primaries, by taking advantage of variation in the primary election environment across
states within years.
Consider the seven states identiﬁed above that adopted mandatory primary elections
after the New Deal. Figure 1 plots the average of the Iit’s for each Congress for the
four Congresses before and after these states introduced mandatory direct primary elec-
tions. Evidently there was no sharp change in the average relative positions of MCs in
these states after the introduction of primaries. If MCs were anticipating the move to
direct primaries then we might expect the change in policy positions to occur before the
7 IndianaandNewYorkintroducedprimaryelectionsfortheHouseearlier,sotheyaredroppedfrom
our analysis of House members’ positions.
8 Although we do not have survey data about the ideological positions of Democratic and Republican
voters prior to 1964, we do have Gallup Poll responses for the early post-New Deal period on
questions related to the current ideological division between Democrats and Republicans. This
poll data shows, for example, identiﬁcation with the Democratic (Republican) party is positively
(negatively) correlated with whether a respondent believed that the government should guarantee
jobs.174 Hirano et al.
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Figure 1. Introduction of direct primaries and individual contribution to polarization.
introduction of primaries. We do not observe a signiﬁcant increase in the polarization of
roll call voting positions even if we compare the position of MCs a few years before or
after the introduction of mandatory primaries.
We use the following speciﬁcation to further examine whether there was a signiﬁcant
change in the roll call voting positions of MCs after the introduction of mandatory
primary laws in the above mentioned states:
Iijkt = αjk + θMjkt + γkt +  ijkt, (1)
where Iijkt is as deﬁned above for member of Congress i in state j and party k for
Congress t; Mjkt is an indicator for whether state j’s party k mandated that its congres-
sional candidates be nominated through direct primaries in the election to Congress t;
and αjk and γkt are state-party and Congress-party ﬁxed effects, respectively. We focus
on the period 1932–2006.
The results, shown in Table 1, provide no systematic evidence that MCs in the late
primaryadoptionstatesbegantakingmoreextremerollcallvotingpositionsfollowingthe
introduction of mandatory primary election laws in their state. If anything, the estimates
of θ suggest that MCs in these states took more moderate positions after primaries were
introducedintheirstates.Thus,mandatoryprimariesdonotappeartohavehadanymore
of a polarizing effect on roll call voting behavior compared to the previous nominating
procedures used in these states.Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress 175
Table 1. Introducing direct primary elections and polariza-
tion in Congress, 1932–2006.
All Democrats Republicans
Senate
Direct Primary −0.043 −0.008 −0.094
(0.035) (0.036) (0.065)
Observations 3,800 2,158 1,642
House
Direct Primary −0.078 −0.051 −0.115
(0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Observations 16,645 9,624 7,021
The above table provides the estimates of ˆ θ from Equation (1). State-
partyandCongressﬁxedeffectsareincludedinallofthemodelsbutare
not shown. Standard errors clustered by state-party are in parentheses.
POLARIZATION AND IDEOLOGICAL COMPOSITION OF
PRIMARY VOTERS
In this section we investigate whether the ideological composition of the primary elec-
torate affects the relationship between primaries and roll call voting behavior. Since the
extreme preferences of the primary electorate are believed to pull MCs away from the
median voter of the general electorate, we would expect that more extreme primary
electorates are associated with more extreme policy positions by MCs.
Various scholars have noted that the ideological gap between the primary electorates
has been increasing at the same time as political parties have become more polarized in
Congress(Fiorinaetal.,2006;FiorinaandLevendusky,2006).Thechangingideological
composition of the primary electorates is commonly attributed to either an increase
in sorting among partisans — conservatives (liberals) are less likely to be Democrat
(Republican) than in the past — and/or to declining primary election turnout that is
associated with lower participation of ideological moderates (King, 2003).9 However,
there is little systematic evidence linking the changes in the composition of the primary
electorate and polarization in Congress.
In our empirical analysis we focus on whether the changes in composition of the
primary electorate associated with changes in turnout levels are systematically related
9 Fiorina and Levendusky (2003, p. 71) summarize the sorting argument as follows: “Because sorting
produces a more homogeneous and a more extreme primary electorate, the pressure increases
for candidates to take consistently liberal or conservative positions on most issues, even when
moderation would be more helpful in the general election. Thus sorted partisans move candidates
toward noncentrist positions.”176 Hirano et al.
to the variation in MCs’ roll call voting positions. Both scholars and journalists claim
that as primary turnout declines the primary electorate becomes more partisan and ide-
ologically extreme. Fiorina and Levendusky (2006, p. 70) write, “As noted previously,
turnout in primary elections is usually very low, so a few core committed supporters (at
least on the lower rungs of the electoral ladder) can be a critically important foundation
for a campaign.” An op-ed in the Washington Post states the following: “Falling turnout
in primary elections, particularly in congressional races in off years, cedes the ﬁeld to
ﬁery partisans.”10 Unlike the “sorting” argument, the changes in the preferences of the
primary electorate due to variation in primary election turnout are not necessarily cor-
related with the changes in the preferences of the general electorate. If turnout affects
the preferences of the primary electorate without signiﬁcantly affecting the preferences
of the general electorate, then this will allow us to identify the effect of primary elec-
torate composition separate from the effect of general electorate composition.11 Thus,
according to the conventional wisdom we should expect low turnout to be associated
with extreme roll call voting positions by MCs.
Althoughwefocusonthevariationinideologicalcompositionoftheprimaryelectorate
associatedwithvariationinturnout,wealsomeasuretheideologicalcompositionofstate
primaryelectoratesmoredirectlyusingpresidentialprimaryexitpolldata.Accordingto
the conventional wisdom, we should expect that the states where the primary exit poll
respondents take more extreme ideological positions to also be the states represented by
senators with more extreme roll call voting positions.
Turnout and Congressional Polarization
Primary election turnout for statewide ofﬁces has declined during the period when
Congress has become more polarized. Figure 2 plots primary election turnout for
statewide ofﬁces as a proportion of total voting age population averaged by decade. We
usethehighestturnoutamongtheofﬁcesasameasureofturnoutforthatelectionyear.12
The ﬁgure illustrates the decline in average level of turnout for state primaries between
the 1970s and 2000s.
Before examining the relationship between turnout and roll call voting behavior, we
ﬁrst use presidential primary and general election exit poll data to verify that primary
10 Op-Ed.“APolarizedNation?”TheWashingtonPostNovember14,2004.AlsoOrnstein(2006)writes
in the New York Times, “The unhappy effects of low turnout are clear: ever-greater polarization in
the country and in Washington, which in turn has led to ever-more rancor and ever-less legislative
progress.”
11 The existing empirical evidence that primary election voters are more extreme than general elec-
tion voters is mixed. Whether one observes a difference in the ideological positions of these two
electorates depends in part upon the states and the elections investigated (e.g., Key, 1956; Ran-
ney and Epstein, 1966; Ranney, 1968; Lengle, 1981; Crotty and Jackson, 1985; Norrander, 1989;
Abramowitz, 2008). If candidates take positions to appeal to their base in the general election (e.g.,
Huntington, 1950; Fiorina, 1974), then we could observe polarization in Congress due to sorting
even when primaries do not affect roll call voting behavior.
12 See Ansolabehere et al. (2006b) for the sources of the primary returns data. The voting age popu-
lation data is from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress 177
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Figure 2. Statewide primary election turnout over time.
election turnout is related to the ideological position of the primary electorates.13 In
these polls respondents were asked their ideological position on a three-point scale. For
eachpresidentialelectionwecancalculatetheaverageideologicalpositionoftheprimary
election exit poll respondents from each state.14 We then average these measures for the
four presidential elections between 1992 and 2004.
A simple regression of the primary electorates’ ideological extremism on the primary
election turnout and the general electorates’ ideological extremism provides evidence
that primary election turnout is negatively correlated with the primary electorate’s
ideological position.15 Unfortunately, we do not have primary election exit poll surveys
for statewide ofﬁce elections, so we assume that a similar pattern exists between turnout
13 Notallstateshadexitpollsurveys.WehavebothDemocraticandRepublicanpartyexitpollsurveys
for AL, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, KS, LA, MA, MD, ME, MN, MO, MS, NC, NH,
NJ, NY, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, VA, VT and WI. In addition we have Republican
exit poll surveys for MI, ND, UT, and WA.
14 As with roll call positions we adjust the ideological positions so that higher scores indicate more
extreme positions for both parties.
15 We use the following speciﬁcation: ¯ Pjk = αk + θ1k ¯ Gik + θ2k ¯ Tjk +  jk, where ¯ Pjk is the average
ideological position of the respondents who voted in the party k’s presidential primary in state j;
¯ Gjk is the average ideological position of respondents who identiﬁed with party k in the presidential
general election in state j; and T is a measure of primary election turnout. We measure primary
election turnout as the votes cast as a proportion of the voting age population. We use the average
of these variables across the four elections between 1992 and 2004. We ﬁnd substantively similar
resultsifwedonotaverageacrossthefourelectionsbuttreateachelectionasaseparateobservation.
The results can be found in Table A1.178 Hirano et al.
and electoral polarization in primary elections for statewide ofﬁces. These results sug-
gest that if the ideological composition of the primary electorate affects roll call voting
behaviorthenweshouldexpectsenatorstohavemoreextreme(moderate)rollcallvoting
positions when primary turnout is low (high).
To estimate the relationship between senators’ roll call voting positions and primary
turnout we use the following speciﬁcation:
Iijkt = αjk + θTjkt + γkt +  ijkt, (2)
where Iijkt is the individual contribution to polarization of senator i who is ﬁrst elected
in state j for party k in year t; and Tjkt is the maximum turnout among the statewide
ofﬁce primaries in state j’s party k in year t. We measure primary election turnout as the
votes cast as a proportion of the voting age population.16 αjk is state-party ﬁxed effect,
which we allow to vary for the periods before and after 1974 to account for the fact that
preferenceswithinstatesmayhaveshiftedovertime.γkt isaCongress-partyﬁxedeffect.
Our analysis covers the half-century between 1948 and 2006. The standard errors are
clustered by state-party.
First we focus on newly elected senators, since changes in roll call voting patterns
are often believed to occur through replacement rather than through adaptation (Stone,
1980;Poole,1997).Theriault(2006)claimsthatcongressionalpolarizationisduemainly
to replacements. Thus we might suspect that senators who are ﬁrst elected in a year with
low primary turnout will take extreme policy positions that reﬂect the preferences of
their primary electorate.
The estimates of θ for newly elected senators are in columns 1 and 2 of row 1 of
Table 2. Since we have relatively few observations of newly elected senators for a given
party in each year, we do not include Congress-party ﬁxed effects. The estimate in
column1isnegativebutnotstatisticallysigniﬁcant.Althoughthesignonthiscoefﬁcient
is consistent with the claims that ideologically extreme primary electorates nominate
more extreme candidates, the magnitude of the average effect is small. A two-standard-
deviation increase in turnout is associated with a shift in the individual contribution
to polarization of less than 0.08 of a standard deviation. Note that while the standard
errors are also large, even if we use the largest estimate of θ within the 95% conﬁdence
interval, a two-standard-deviation increase in turnout is associated with a decrease in
the individual contribution to polarization of less than 0.40 of a standard deviation.
Furthermore, when state-party ﬁxed effects are included (column 2), the estimate of θ
is positive, the opposite of what we would expect given the popular claims.
Next,weexaminewhetherthereisanyevidencethatsenatorsingeneralwererespond-
ing to long-term trends in turnout within their states. We use the same speciﬁcation
16 We had hoped to also exploit the variation in primary election turnout that occurs due to whether
the congressional primary is on the same day as a presidential primary. We ﬁnd that congressional
primary turnout is only affected when the presidential primary is on the same day and is also
contested. There are very few cases in our data sets of open seat primary elections whose turnout
should be affected by a contested presidential primary. During the period 1980–2004, we ﬁnd no
statistically signiﬁcant evidence that MCs whose open seat primary occurs on the same day as a
contested presidential primary have relatively moderate roll call voting positions.Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress 179
Table 2. Primary elections and roll call voting positions 1948–2006.
Newly elected All senators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary turnout −0.097 0.411 −0.399 0.342
(0.183) (0.338) (0.212) (0.178)
Observations 292 2,484
Contested primaries −0.018 0.054 −0.017 0.056
(0.053) (0.096) (0.041) (0.030)
Observations 250 2,078
Close primaries −0.051 −0.039 −0.036 0.049
(0.063) (0.123) (0.048) (0.033)
Observations 250 2,074
Standard errors clustered by state-party are in parentheses. The speciﬁcations in
columns 2 and 4 include state-party ﬁxed effects which differ before and after 1974.
Columns 3 and 4 include Congress-party ﬁxed effects.
as above but now include all senators — incumbent and newly elected — and measure
turnout as the average turnout in the six years prior to and including the election at
time t, ¯ Tjkt.17 We also now include Congress-party ﬁxed effects. The estimate of θ in
column3(row1)isagainnotstatisticallysigniﬁcantbutthecoefﬁcientisrelativelylarge.
A two-standard-deviation increase in turnout is associated with a shift in the individual
contribution to polarization of less than a third of a standard deviation. While the stan-
dard errors are large, even if we use the largest estimate of θ within the 95% conﬁdence
interval,atwo-standard-deviationincreaseinturnoutisassociatedwithadecreaseinthe
individual contribution to polarization of less than 0.68 of a standard deviation. More-
over,thisresultmainlyreﬂectsthehighturnoutandmoderateDW-NOMINATEscores
of Democratic senators in the South. When southern states prior to 1990 are excluded
from the analysis, the coefﬁcient drops to 20% of the magnitude of the estimate which
includes southern states in the 1970s and 1980s. Also, the estimate of θ in column 4 (row
1), which includes state-party ﬁxed effects, is no longer statistically signiﬁcant and the
point estimate is positive, the opposite of what would we would expect given the popular
claims. Thus, the evidence that low turnout is related to senators with more extreme roll
call voting positions is weak at best.
Ideologically Polarized Primary Electorates, 1992–2004
To further examine the relationship between the ideological position of primary vot-
ers and senators’ roll call voting positions, we use the state level average ideological
position of presidential primary exit poll respondents described above. Assuming that
17 The substantive ﬁndings are robust to the number of years used to calculate turnout.180 Hirano et al.
Table 3. Ideological composition of electorate and roll call voting
positions, 1992–2004.
Democrats Republicans Ideological gap
Primary electorate −0.119 0.480 −0.185
(0.242) (0.272) (0.224)
General electorate 0.943 1.232 −0.005
(0.319) (0.399) (0.400)
Observations 31 31 25
the presidential and non-presidential primary electorates have similar ideological lean-
ings, we would expect states with more polarized primary electorates to also have more
polarized Senate delegations.
To estimate this relationship between senators’ individual contributions to polariza-
tion and preferences of the primary electorate we use the following speciﬁcation:
¯ Ijk = αk + θ1 ¯ Pjk + θ2 ¯ Gjk +  jk, (3)
where ¯ Ijk is the average individual contribution to polarization of incumbents in state j
frompartykbetween1992and2004;and ¯ Pjk and ¯ Gjk aretheaverageideologicalpositions
of primary and general election exit poll respondents who either voted in the primary
for party k or voted in the general election and identify with party k.
The estimates of θ1 and θ2, shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, suggest that
the ideological position of the general electorate exit poll respondents has a stronger
association with senators’ contributions to polarization than the ideological position of
the primary electorate. This is true for senators of both parties.
We can also examine whether the gap in Democratic and Republican senators’ DW-
NOMINATE scores is related to the ideological gap in the primary electorates using
a similar speciﬁcation as in Equation (3), but redeﬁning the variables to reﬂect the
differences between the parties’ senators and electorates. The coefﬁcient estimates in
column 3 reveal no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the partisan ideological
gapamongtheprimaryexitpollrespondentsandthepartisangapamongsenators’DW-
NOMINATE scores — i.e. a large ideological gap between Democratic and Republican
primaryvotersinastateisnotassociatedwithalargegapinDemocraticandRepublican
senators’ DW-NOMINATE scores within that same state.
PRIMARY COMPETITION AND SENATE POLARIZATION
Another popular belief is that the electoral threat of facing a challenger with a more
extremeideologicalorpartisanpositionintheprimariesisoneofthefactorscontributing
to polarization in Congress. Differences in the threat of primary competition across
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campaign ﬁnance laws, and other election laws. The differences may also arise from
the structure of the political party organizations. Political parties with internal factional
divisions are likely to have more primary competition. In addition, idiosyncratic factors
mayaffectparticularcandidatesatparticulartimes—e.g.,scandals,careertrajectoriesof
co-partisans who are potential challengers, and personal rivalries with party or interest
group leaders.
Using a very simple model we ﬁrst discuss why the competition MCs face in their
own primary elections is a poor measure of the threat of primary competition affecting
MCs’ roll call voting positions. We demonstrate that this measure will lead to a biased
estimate of the relationship between the threat of primary competition and polarization
in Congress. We then demonstrate how the threat of primary competition may be better
measured using the average level of primary competition across several down-ballot
statewide ofﬁces. We construct such a measure using a new data set of primary election
outcomes for down-ballot statewide ofﬁces.18
The second part of this section examines whether this measure is correlated with
senators’ roll call voting positions. As above we ﬁrst examine whether the competitive-
ness of primaries in the year senators are initially elected is correlated with their roll
call voting position during their ﬁrst Congress session. We then examine whether the
competitiveness of primary elections has an effect on all senators. We ﬁnd little evidence
that the competitiveness of the primary environment is signiﬁcantly related to senators’
roll call positions.
Measuring the Threat from Primary Competition
As noted in the Introduction, many scholars have argued that members of Congress
respond to electoral threats. Several scholars, for example, argue that when gerryman-
dering produces “safe” districts — districts where one party is clearly favored in the
general election — then congressional incumbents adopt more extreme positions in an
attempt to reduce the threat posed by potential primary challengers.
Ideally,wewouldliketoestimatetheimpactofprimaryelectionthreatsontheideolog-
icalpositionstakenbymembersofCongress.Unfortunately,wecannotdirectlymeasure
primary electoral threats. As noted above, previous studies have used realized primary
competition as a proxy for these threats. However, if the deterrence logic above holds,
thentherealizedlevelofcompetitionwilldependuponincumbents’ideologicalposition.
Therefore a regression of incumbents’ positions on realized primary competition will
not yield a consistent estimate of the relationship of interest.
A simple model may clarify this claim. First, assume that the realized level of primary
competition faced by incumbent i is positively related to a latent threat level, Tj, and
negatively related to the incumbent’s roll call score:
Cij = β2Tj − γNij + µij.( 4 )
18 See Ansolabehere et al. (2006b) for a description of this data set.182 Hirano et al.
The variable Tj captures features of the electoral environment mentioned above, and
µij captures idiosyncratic factors peculiar to i’s situation. The middle term captures the
“scare-off” effect — controlling for the latent threat level, incumbents who are more
extremearelesslikelytofaceaseriousprimarychallenge(asabove,ahigherNi isamore
extreme score).
Assuming that incumbents take action to avoid primary challenges, the roll call score
of incumbent i, Ni, will depend positively on the latent primary election threat level, Tj
(and possibly µij assuming that the incumbent observes µij sufﬁciently in advance):
Nij = β1Tj +  ij. (5)
Substituting Equation (5) into Equation (4) yields:
Nij =
β1
β2 − β1γ
Cij +

 ij −
β1
β2
µij

β2
β2 − β1γ

. (6)
Given that Tj and µij are unobservable, the only quantity of interest we can estimate
is β1/β2.I fγ  = 0 then regressing Nij on Cij will lead to an upwardly biased estimate
of β1/β2 (this is an example of classic simultaneous equation bias). Furthermore, even
if γ = 0 the estimated regression coefﬁcient will still be biased, since Cij and µij are
correlated as written in Equation (4) (this is an example of classic measurement error
bias).
Rather than using Cij as the regressor, we propose using the average level of realized
primary competition for down-ballot statewide races, ¯ Cj.19 While not a panacea, there
are conditions under which this approach has clear advantages over using Cij. One
condition is that γ = 0, so there is no simultaneity and the only problem with using
Cij is measurement error. In this case if the µijs are not too highly correlated, then ¯ Cj
will be a more accurate measure of β2Tj. Another condition is that ideology is not as
salient in down-ballot races as it is in senate primary races. In the extreme case γ = 0f o r
down-ballot races — i.e. the ideological position of candidates for down-ballot ofﬁces
does not affect the realized level of competition — our estimate will not be biased. We
suspect that γ>0 for down-ballot candidates, but it is probably smaller than for Senate
candidates.Thismaybebecauseideologicalpositionsarelessrelevantfortheseofﬁces—
e.g.,secretaryofstate,auditor,andtreasureraremainlybureaucraticposts—orbecause
voters have much less information about the ideological positions of the candidates for
these ofﬁces.
Threat of Primary Competition and Roll Call Voting Behavior
According to the above discussion, averaging primary competition across several down-
ballot ofﬁces is likely to be a better measure of the threat of facing a primary challenger
than senators’ own primary competition. We use two different measures of primary
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competition: (i) the proportion of primary elections that are contested; and (ii) the
proportion of primary elections where the nominee is selected with less than 60% of
the vote. We use the average level of primary competition from six years prior to and
including the Congress of interest.20
Weestimatetherelationshipbetweenindividualsenators’contributionstopolarization
and primary competition using the following speciﬁcation:
Iijkt = αjk + θCjkt + γkt +  ijkt, (7)
where Iijkt is the individual contribution to polarization of senator i in state j and party k
intheﬁrsttwoyearsfollowingtheirﬁrstelectionattimet;Cjkt isthemeasureofprimary
competition in state j’s party k at time t; and αjk and γkt are state-party and Congress-
party ﬁxed effects, respectively. As above we allow the state-party ﬁxed effect to vary
between the pre- and post-1974 periods.
The estimates of θ in Table 2 provide little evidence that the competitiveness of pri-
maries when senators are ﬁrst elected is related to their contribution to polarization
duringtheirﬁrstelectedterminofﬁce.Theresultsarenotstatisticallysigniﬁcant.When
state-party ﬁxed effects are not included or when competition is measured by the pro-
portion of close races, the estimate of θ is negative — i.e., more primary competition
is associated with more moderate roll call voting scores. The magnitude of the point
estimate is also not very large. In the analysis including state-party ﬁxed effects, a two-
standard-deviation change in the proportion of contested primary elections in a newly
elected senator’s state is associated with less than 0.16 of a standard deviation shift in
the senator’s contribution to polarization. Note, however, that the standard errors on
the estimate of θ are fairly large. If we use the maximum estimate of θ within the 95%
conﬁdence interval, we ﬁnd that a two-standard-deviation increase in primary contesta-
tion is associated with about a 0.71 standard deviation higher individual contribution to
polarization.
Another possibility is that senators adjust their policy positions in response to the
changes in the competitiveness of primaries over time. Although primary competition
overall has not been increasing during the period when congressional roll call voting has
become more polarized, the variation in primary competition may explain some of the
variation across states over time. We use the same speciﬁcation as in Equation (7) above,
but now we include all senators. The estimates of θ in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 are
all small and insigniﬁcant. Thus, there is little evidence that senators’ contributions to
polarizationandourmeasuresofprimarycompetitionhaveastrongpositivecorrelation.
The point estimate of θ is even negative when state-party ﬁxed effects are not included.
When state-party ﬁxed effects are included a two-standard-deviation increase in the
proportion of contested primaries in a state is associated with a change of less than
0.16 of a standard deviation in individual senators’ contributions to polarization. Using
20 We checked the sensitivity of our estimates to the length of the window, and also to the choice
of which races are used — all races, incumbents-contested races only, and open seat races — in
constructing the primary competition measures. The substantive interpretation of the ﬁndings
reported is not signiﬁcantly affected by the different measures.184 Hirano et al.
the maximum estimate of θ within 95% conﬁdence interval, a two-standard-deviation
increase in primary competition is associated with a third of a standard deviation higher
individual contribution to polarization.
ROLL CALL VOTING POSITIONS AND ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
Despite the popular perception that competition in primary elections provides an elec-
toralincentiveforrepresentativestotakemoreextremepolicypositions,theresultsinthe
above sections provide little evidence that primary elections are associated with polar-
izationinrollcallvoting.Oneoftheassumptionsunderlyingtheconventionalwisdomis
that MCs have an electoral incentive to take extreme roll call voting positions. Although
there are some empirical ﬁndings that House members with relatively extreme roll call
voting scores do better in primary elections (Brady et al., 2007), there are also ﬁndings
that there are electoral beneﬁts in the general elections from taking more moderate roll
call voting positions (Ansolabehere et al., 2001; Canes-Wrone et al., 2002). Even though
primary elections may provide some electoral incentive for MCs to take extreme posi-
tions,whetherornotcandidatesrespondtotheseincentivesalsodependsuponhowtheir
position will affect general election outcomes.
We begin this section by re-examining the claim that extreme roll call voting posi-
tions are positively correlated with primary election outcomes. We then compare these
results with the relationship between roll call voting positions and general election out-
comes to examine the overall electoral costs candidates potentially face from not taking
extreme policy positions. Finally, we examine the political careers of moderate senators
to determine whether they tended to leave Congress after a primary election defeat.
Note that in this section, we follow the literature and use DW-NOMINATE scores,
which is not deviated from their party means as in the above sections, as our main
independent variable of interest. We orient the scores so that for each party a higher
DW-NOMINATE score indicates a more extreme roll call voting position.
Roll Voting and Primary Election Outcomes
Our analysis of primary election outcomes and roll call voting behavior focuses on the
Senate. The multi-member district feature of U.S. Senate elections means that the same
constituency may be represented by two senators from the same party but different roll
call voting positions. We exploit this feature to examine whether the variation in the
primary election vote shares of senators from the same party and state is related to their
roll call voting positions. Conventional wisdom is that senators with relatively partisan
rollcallvotingpositionswillhaverelativelyhighvotesharesintheprimaryelections.We
also take advantage of the lack of redistricting in the Senate that gives greater ﬂexibility
in making comparisons of senators’ roll call voting records over time.
Since many primary elections are uncontested, we ﬁrst examine whether senators’
roll call voting positions are related to whether they face primary challengers. For this
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are: (1) whether the senator faces a challenge in his or her primary; and (2) whether the
senator faces a close primary challenge (i.e., the nominee wins with less than 60% of
the primary vote). The main independent variable of interest is the candidate’s roll call
voting position, which we measure using DW-NOMINATE scores. We also include the
degree of primary contestation for all down-ballot statewide ofﬁces in the previous six
years as well as state party ﬁxed effects and an indicator variable for whether there is an
incumbent in the primary race.21
TheresultspresentedinthetopsectionofTable4providesomeevidencethatsenators’
DW-NOMINATE scores are correlated with whether they are challenged in primary
elections in the expected direction — i.e., candidates with more extreme position are
less likely to face a primary challenge. This effect is statistically signiﬁcant when state-
party ﬁxed effects are not included. A two-standard-deviation change in a senator’s
DW-NOMINATEscoreisassociatedwithan11%reductionintheprobabilityoffacing
Table 4. Linear probability model of primary contestation and
roll call voting positions in the Senate, 1948–2006.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contested Senate Primary
Primary contestation 0.634 0.629 0.225 0.143
(0.061) (0.073) (0.095) (0.111)
DW-NOMINATE −0.298 −0.141
(0.110) (0.191)
Incumbent −0.281 −0.308 −0.283 −0.284
(0.031) (0.035) (0.032) (0.042)
Observations 1,396 789 1,398 789
Closely Contested Senate Primary
Close primary 0.345 0.215 0.168 0.089
(0.076) (0.062) (0.099) (0.103)
DW-NOMINATE −0.061 0.061
(0.065) (0.131)
Incumbent −0.336 −0.292 −0.336 −0.281
(0.024) (0.033) (0.025) (0.037)
Observations 1,392 787 1,392 787
Columns (3) and (4) include state-party ﬁxed effects which are allowed to
differafter1974.Standarderrorsclusteredbystate-partyareinparentheses.
21 For incumbents we use the DW-NOMINATE score for the Congress just prior to the election. In
order to include cases for non-incumbents we use the DW-NOMINATE scores for the Congress
just after the election.186 Hirano et al.
a primary contestant. The coefﬁcient is no longer statistically signiﬁcant when state-
party ﬁxed effects are included. The results in the bottom section of Table 4 suggest
that whether the senator faced a close primary challenge is not strongly related to their
DW-NOMINATE score.
The second relationship of interest is whether the roll call voting position of senators
who are challenged in a primary is related to the number of votes they receive in the
primary election. Again the conventional wisdom is that senators with relatively more
extreme policy positions should have relatively higher vote shares in the primary. We
measure senators’ vote shares as the proportion of votes cast for the top two candidates.
The main independent variable is the senator’s roll call voting position. We include
state-party ﬁxed effects, which we allow to vary before and after 1974, to account for
differencesinprimaryelectoratesacrossstates.Weexploitthevariationinrollcallvoting
positions of members representing the same state.
The coefﬁcient of interest, presented in column 1 of Table 5, is very close to zero and
not statistically signiﬁcant.22 Thus, when senators face a primary challenger, their roll
call voting positions do not appear to be strongly related to their primary election vote
shares.
Roll Voting and General Election Outcomes
As the above discussion suggests, primary elections appear to provide little electoral
motivation for senators to take extreme roll call voting positions. We now turn to the
Table 5.ElectionoutcomesandrollcallvotingintheSenate,1948–2006.
Primary election General election
DW-NOMINATE score 0.002 −0.135 −0.127
(0.078) (0.021) (0.021)
Incumbent 0.134 0.040 0.046
(0.017) (0.005) (0.006)
Normal vote 0.752
(0.065)
Net incumbency −0.034
(0.007)
Observations 548 1,022 925
State-party ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. The speciﬁcation in
columns2and3alsoincludeCongress-partyﬁxedeffects.Standarderrorsclustered
by state-party are in parentheses.
22 This coefﬁcient is positive but still not statistically signiﬁcant when we limit the sample to incum-
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question of whether extreme roll call positions affect senators’ success in general
elections.
In the analysis above we used a simple ﬁxed effects regression and assumed that
state preferences were being captured by the state-party ﬁxed effects. We use a similar
speciﬁcation to test the relationship between senators’ roll call voting positions and their
support in general elections. The dependent variable is the senator’s vote share of the
two party vote. The main independent variable of interest is the senator’s roll call voting
position, as measured by their DW-NOMINATE score. We include state-party and
Congress-party ﬁxed effects. In a second speciﬁcation we include measures of the state
normal vote using the average vote share of down-ballot ofﬁces for previous elections.
Table 6. Reasons why Senate moderates and “misﬁts” left the senate.
Democrats Republicans
State Senator Reason State Senator Reason
AL Sparkman Retired CT Weicker Lost general
AL Allen Died in ofﬁce IL Percy Lost general
AL Shelby Switched parties KS Pearson Retired
AL Heﬂin Retired KY Cooper Retired
AR McClellan Died in ofﬁce MA Brooke Lost general
FL Holland Retired MD Mathias Retired
GA Russell Died in ofﬁce ME W. Cohen Retired
GA H. Talmadge Lost general ME Snowe Still serving
GA Nunn Retired ME Collins Still serving
GA Z. Miller Retired MN Durenberger Retired
LA Ellender Lost primary NJ Case Lost primary
LA R. Long Retired NY Goodell Lost general
LA Breaux Retired NY Javits Lost primary
MS Eastland Retired OR Hatﬁeld Retired
MS Stennis Retired OR Packwood Retired
NC Ervin Retired PA Schweiker Retired
NC Jordan Lost primary PA Heinz Died in ofﬁce
NE Zorinsky Died in ofﬁce PA Specter Still serving
NE Nelson Still serving RI J. Chafee Died
OK Boren Retired RI L. Chafee Lost general
TX Krueger Lost general VT Aiken Retired
VA Byrd Jr. Switched parties VT Stafford Retired
FL Stone Lost primary VT Jeffords Switched parties
NC Morgan Lost general ME Smith Lost general
TX Bentsen Resigned ND Andrews Lost general188 Hirano et al.
The results in Table 5 provide some evidence that incumbent senators with extreme
roll call voting positions have lower vote shares in the general election than moderates.
Theincreasingcompetitivenessofgeneralelectioncompetitionsuggeststhatincumbent
senators who wish to retain their position have a strong incentive to take moderate
positions. The evidence is not as robust for open seat races.
What Happens to Moderates in Congress?
Finally, if taking moderate policy positions leaves candidates vulnerable in primary
elections, then we would expect a disproportionately large number of moderate MCs
to leave ofﬁce because they lose a primary election. We deﬁne moderate senators as
Democrats with DW-NOMINATE scores of greater than −0.15 and Republicans with
DW-NOMINATE scores of less than 0.10.
Table 6 lists the causes for why moderate senators left ofﬁce. We focus on senators
who served for more than one term between the 91st to the 110th Congress. Among
the 25 moderate Democrats in the Senate during this period only 3 left ofﬁce due to
being defeated in a primary. Of the 25 moderate Republican only 2 left ofﬁce due to
being defeated in a primary. Overall, twice as many moderate senators lost in a general
electionaslostinaprimary.Mostsimplyretired.Ofcourse,someoftheretirementsmay
have been strategic, with an electoral defeat likely. Also moderate senators who succeed
in winning ofﬁce may be different than other senators. Nonetheless, Table 6 at least
suggests that primary competition does not have an obvious role in forcing moderate
incumbent senators out of ofﬁce.
CONCLUSIONS
Scholars,journalists,andpoliticianshavelongclaimedthatprimaryelectionscontribute
to the ideological polarization in political parties. The logic behind this claim is very
straightforward:Inordertogainamajorpartynomination,politiciansneedtotakeposi-
tions that appeal to the more ideologically extreme primary electorates. This argument
has come under increased scrutiny with the recent rise of polarization between the polit-
ical parties and the search for an explanation (e.g., Fiorina et al., 2006; McCarty et al.
2006).Theempiricalevidencelinkingprimariesandcongressionalpolarizationhasbeen
mixed.
In this paper we begin by examining three variables that should be correlated with
extreme policy positions by members of Congress if the conventional wisdom is cor-
rect about primaries and polarization. The three variables are: (1) the introduction of
primaries; (2) the polarization of the primary electorates; and (3) the threat of primary
competition. Our analysis of these three variables points to the conclusion that primary
elections have little or no association with polarization in congressional roll call voting
behavior.
This ﬁnding casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that the primary system in the
United States fuels the growing ideological schism between the parties. That conjecturePrimary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress 189
Table A1. Primary electorate ideology and turnout 1992–2004.
Democrats Republicans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary turnout −0.011 −0.014 −0.009 −0.007
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Ideology of general electorate 1.118 0.059 0.760 −0.203
(0.122) (0.269) (0.180) (0.160)
Observations 34 64 38 74
Each election is a separate observation in columns (2) and (4). Columns (2) and (4) include state
and year ﬁxed effects. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.
is widely taken as a truism in public discourse and among political scientists, from
those writing for popular audiences to those writing textbooks to those working on
mathematicalmodelsofpoliticalstrategy.Itisevenreachingintothecomparativepolitics
literature, especially in Latin America, where several countries use primary elections
(see Carey and Polga-Hecimovich, 2006). This paper contributes to the growing doubt
about this claim (see also Abramowitz, 2008).
The positive ﬁnding that does emerge from this research underscores a central con-
jecture of political science, namely, general election competition creates pressure for
ideological convergence and moderation. That effect emerges clearly from U.S. Senate
elections. Even still, general election pressures are not sufﬁcient to produce complete
convergenceoftheparties.Findingthechiefcausesofpartydifferentiationandmodera-
tion, then, remains an important problem. The evidence here indicates that the primary
electionsystemdoesnotappeartobeamongtheimportantfactorsproducingpolarization
of the political parties in the United States.
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